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FOREWORD 
 
The inherent nature of cattle farming with its long production cycle makes it difficult 
to control and predict beef supplies and prices. In Ireland, these inherent 
characteristics are further complicated by being heavily influenced by EU beef policy 
in relation to income support and export trading conditions. Major EU policy changes 
over the last twenty years have affected  the export competitiveness of Irish beef. The 
WTO agreement in 1994 and the more recent international financial crises, especially 
in Russia, have severely constrained Irish beef exports to traditional and evolving 
markets in third countries. Various food safety issues, in particular the BSE crisis, 
have further accentuated the market imbalance in the EU. The decline in consumption 
combined with the re-nationalised EU beef market has impacted most severely on 
Irish beef. 
 
Teagasc, in conjunction with University College Dublin, has initiated research to 
establish how Ireland could develop a more strategic approach to the evolution of a 
single EU beef market. A number of joint working papers have been prepared on 
various aspects of EU policy for beef and their implications for cattle prices, direct 
payments and farm income in Ireland. To facilitate public discussion on these very 
important topics it has been decided to publish these working papers. The authors of 
the working papers invite comments and observations on their analysis and 
conclusions. 
 
 
Liam Downey 
Director,  
Teagasc. 
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 Introduction 
 
The intervention system for beef in the EU has undergone major changes since its 
inception. These changes were introduced because of changing circumstances in the 
EU beef market and because of cost factors and inefficiencies associated with and 
arising from the intervention system itself. While justified from these perspectives it 
can be said that from the perspective of beef producers the system has changed from 
being a mechanism which aimed at and operated to achieve a producer Guide Price 
which in turn was defined as “……..the price which it is hoped to attain on average 
on the Community market for all the quantities marketed during a given marketing 
year” (Com 370, July 1976) to one which has abandoned all efforts at achieving a 
desirable producer price and which provides at best very short term stabilisation of 
price at its market level.  
 
The aim of this paper is to trace the major changes which have occurred to the 
intervention system and the concomitant price achievement of beef in general in the 
EU and especially that of Irish beef. These changes together with other market and 
policy factors occurring on and since 1996 have combined to give a historically poor 
price performance for Irish beef which despite the growing importance of direct 
payments is still of major significance in the incomes and welfare of beef producers.  
 
Intervention 
 
The basic regulation, Regulation 805/68 set out the field of application of 
intervention. Under that regulation intervention measures could be applied when 
prices on the Community market ceased to remunerate production at a level close to 
the Guide Price.  
Three types of intervention in the form of public buying-in were provided for, only 
two of which depended on the level of prices on the Community market, calculated on 
the basis of prices recorded on the representative markets of each member state.  
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(a) Where the Community market price for adult bovine animals was less than 98 % 
of the Guide Price and simultaneously the market price in a certain region was 
less than 93% of the Guide Price, intervention measures could be taken in the 
regions concerned.  
 
(b) Where the Community market price was less than 93% (subsequently reduced to 
90%) of the Guide Price, intervention was automatic throughout the Community. 
 
(c) There was a system of “permanent” intervention, which was unrelated to the 
levels mentioned above. Introduced by the Council on 20 December 1972, its aim 
was to enable operators to offer certain high quality meat at any time, whatever 
the Community market price, and to receive 93% of the Guide Price.  
 
However the obligation on intervention agencies to buy was modified for the 1976/77 
marketing year to avoid encouraging production which would only be destined only 
for intervention. Council Regulation No. 568/76 of 15 May 1976 provided that if the 
price recorded on the representative markets of a member state or of a region of a 
member state is at or greater than 95% of  the Guide Price the “permanent” 
intervention measures may be totally or partially suspended in the member state or 
region.  
 
Support buying at that time operated for steers, bulls, heifers and for a time in the mid 
1970s for cows also. Upper and lower buying-in prices were set for each of the 
support buying categories. The upper buying-in price was linked directly to the cattle 
intervention price by means of a specified coefficient and a killing-out percentage. 
The lower buying-in price was set at a fixed amount below the upper buying-in price. 
There was therefore, at that time, a direct link between the Guide Price (the price 
which it was felt, producers should receive), the intervention price and the buying-in 
price when intervention was in operation.  
 
Buying in by the intervention agency was governed by three requirements of which 
the first (and the one of relevance here) was  
 
- “to ensure effective market support” (Com 370, 1976) 
 
Changes were introduced in September 1978 (Reg. EEC 2226/78) which were aimed 
at making the support system more responsive to market conditions although by to-
day’s standards they continued to afford a very high level of market support for 
producer prices. This regulation required that  
 
(a) If, for any particular intervention category of beef, a country’s Reference Price 
(i.e. general market price) remains between 100 and 102% of its upper buying-in 
price for a period of 3 weeks, the EEC Commission may, after consulting the Beef 
Management Committee, suspend support-buying of that category in the country 
concerned. 
 
(b) If the Reference Price for a category remains above 102% of the upper buying-in 
price for 3 weeks, the Commission may suspend support-buying for that category 
without having to consult the Management Committee. 
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(c) If a country’s Reference Price for a particular category, on which support buying 
has been suspended, remains at or below 100% of its upper buying-in price for a 
period of 2 weeks, then the Commission shall automatically re-introduce support 
buying for that category in the country concerned. 
 
(d) As a result of a gentleman’s agreement, which had to be renewed annually, 
suspension of support-buying under these arrangements in Ireland did not take 
place unless the Reference Price there was more than 85% of the EEC Guide 
Price.  
 
The aim was very obviously to use intervention to try to achieve effective market 
price support. Specifically the aim was to achieve at least 100% of the Intervention 
Price, equivalent to 90% of the Guide Price, for EU beef producers generally, and at 
least 85% of the Guide Price, equivalent to 94% of the Intervention Price, for Irish 
producers.  How well did this system perform ? 
 
Performance of intervention 1973-87 
 
Table 1. shows calculated ratios of market (reference) prices to intervention prices for 
beef and veal across the EU for most of the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
Table 1.  Ratio of market (reference) prices to intervention prices for beef/veal 
Year * EU average**excluding 
Ireland  
Ireland 
1973/74 1.11 1.05 
1974/75 0.94 0.80 
1975/76 0.98 0.82 
1976/77 0.96 0.86 
1977/78 0.97 0.80 
1978/79 0.95 0.83 
1979/80 0.94 0.81 
1980/81 0.93 0.80 
1981/82 0.97 0.86 
1982/83 0.94 0.82 
1983/84 0.88 0.80 
1984/85 0.84 0.79 
1985 0.84 0.77 
1986 0.79 0.70 
1987 0.75 0.69 
Average over the period 0.92 0.82 
% achievement of target of 
100 % of Intervention 
Price 
92 
(i.e. 92/100) 
 
% achievement of target of 
94% of Intervention Price 
  
87  
(i.e. 82/94) 
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*   April-March year up to and including 1984/85; calendar year thereafter with 3  
     months overlap between 1984/85 and 1985. 
** Simple arithmetic average across 8 EU countries up to and including 1984/85; the   
     simple arithmetic average across 7 EU countries (excl. Luxembourg) thereafter. 
 
 
For both the EU excluding Ireland and for Ireland the trend in the degree of 
realisation of the intervention price at producer level was generally and strongly 
downward. On average over the period, the degree to which a higher target was 
achieved for the EU excluding Ireland was greater than was the degree of 
achievement of the lower target for Ireland. Nevertheless, despite the poor relative 
performance for Ireland, the system did provide significant support for Irish producer 
prices over what an unregulated market would have returned. 
 
This was demonstrated by  Sheehy and O’ Connell (1986) who measured the degree 
of market support given by the intervention system in 1985 but operating under the 
conditions outlined above. Three market support effects were identified. These were: 
 
1. A general EU market effect. Under this heading it was estimated that the absence 
of intervention purchases in 1985 would have caused all EU beef prices to fall by 
10.2 %, equivalent to a general fall in Irish prices of 9.1p/lb. 
 
2. A further Irish intervention bonus effect. This arose because of the fact that 
intervention prices were higher than market prices for Irish beef. It was estimated 
that the absence of intervention in 1985 would have caused a price drop of 9.8 
p/lb on beef sold into intervention, or a general drop of 1.35 p/lb when averaged 
across all Irish beef sold that year.  
 
3. A further Irish market share effect. This arose because purchases of beef into 
intervention constituted a higher proportion of production than was the case for 
other EU states. Abolition of intervention therefore would have resulted in an 
increased market share for Irish beef and an estimated further reduction in Irish 
prices solely of 2.8% or 2.5p/lb.  
 
The combined effects came to a reduction in Irish beef prices of 14.5% or 13p/lb 
implying a reduction in revenue to Irish beef producers of £147 million and equating 
with a 36% reduction in income from beef production.  
 
By the late 1970s it was generally felt that the industry relied too much on 
intervention and needed to be more selective and more responsive to market 
conditions. This prompted a series of modifications including the abolition of 
permanent intervention and the introduction of the “stop-go” mechanism whereby 
intervention could be switched on or off for a particular quality if the market price 
exceeded the relevant buying-in price in an individual member state. (Owing to a 
derogation, Ireland never operated the “stop-go” mechanism). By 1983 heifers were 
no longer eligible for intervention and seasonalised buying (forequarters in the 
summer and hindquarters in the winter) was introduced. In the following March the 
EEC carcass classification grid was applied to intervention enabling the 
harmonisation of qualities and buying-in prices.  
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Intervention 1987- 89 
 
In late 1985 the EEC Commission presented a report on the future of the beef regime 
suggesting that public intervention should be used only as a safety net, with other 
forms of support used more actively. This report was discussed in 1986 during which 
the traditional intervention system was maintained. Intervention purchases in 1986 
reached a record of 560,000 tonnes but this did not stop prices declining to a level 
lower than heretofore in both the EU as a whole and in Ireland.  
 
The proposed use of intervention solely as a safety net proved unacceptable. When 
agreement was eventually reached in December 1986 on a new public intervention 
system, the link between buying-in price and an institutionally set intervention 
price was finally broken marking a major milestone in the reduction in influence of 
the intervention system.  While significant volumes were sold into intervention in 
succeeding years, this change significantly reduced the price supporting role of 
intervention buying and removed entirely the price bonus effect as described and 
quantified above for Irish beef. The system was implemented on a temporary basis 
from 6 April 1987 to 31 December 1988.  
 
Under the new temporary system, member states chose both the category and 
conformation of beef they wished to intervene on, subject to price conditions being 
met.  
 
The price conditions were twofold. For intervention to operate on a Community basis 
the EEC average deadweight cattle price for a given quality of beef, e.g. steers grade 
R, had to be below 91% of the EEC Intervention Price. To be eligible on a national 
basis, an individual member state’s average deadweight price for that quality had also 
to be below 87% of the EEC Intervention Price. (The ‘Intervention Price’ referred to 
here was that set by the Agriculture Ministers for the marketing year and was not the 
price at which beef was purchased into intervention.)  
 
Buying-in prices were calculated using weekly deadweight cattle prices in those 
member states where prices were below 87% of the Intervention Price. In theory, 
therefore, trends in the market were reflected in the buying-in prices. Two weeks’ 
deadweight cattle prices were used to calculate the next month’s buying-in prices thus 
linking prices at which product was bought into intervention with market prices. 
Because certain member states thought this would have a downward spiralling effect 
on buying-in prices, two additional elements were included in the calculation. Firstly 
a fixed amount of 8.6 ECU (i.e.2.5% of the R3 intervention price) was added to 
determine the carcass equivalent buying-in price for that conformation quality. 
Secondly, if the resultant price was less than any national price used in the calculation 
then the highest national price was used in its place – referred to as the ‘highest price 
rule’.  
 
Thus, there was acceptance, albeit for intervention purposes, of the idea of using a 
particular EU state’s price performance as a target price for other EU states. 
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Intervention arrangements 1989-1993 
 
On April 3rd, 1989 new intervention arrangements were put in place which operated 
until 1993 
 
1. Eligibility under ceiling 
 
Under these arrangements intervention buying-in could operate for a given grade in a 
member state when the following two conditions had been met for two consecutive 
weeks: 
 
- the average EU market price for that grade was less than 88% of the Intervention 
Price 
- the average market price for the same grade in that member state was less than 
84% of the Intervention Price (Triggers under the previous arrangements were 
91% and 87% for EU and member state respectively) 
 
 
2. Eligibility over ceiling 
 
The tender arrangements ceased if: 
 
(a) the above conditions were not met for two weeks in a row, or 
(b) a ceiling of 220,000 tonnes of beef bought into intervention was reached in the EU 
 
However, even if the ceiling was reached, tender procedures for a given grade could 
be reopened if, for two weeks in a row: 
 
- the average EU market price for that grade fell below 84% of the Intervention 
Price, and 
- the average market price in a member state fell below 80% of the Intervention 
Price for the same grade 
 
3. Safety net arrangements 
 
There was also a safety net arrangement to prevent a downward spiral in market 
prices. Under this arrangement intervention could operate, if one of the following 
situations occurred for two weeks in a row: 
 
(a) the market price for a given grade fell below 80% of the Intervention Price in at 
least 3 member states or regions of a member state which together, produce 55% 
or more of EU young bull or steer beef production. If this happened, intervention 
buying of this grade would take place in those member states or regions where the 
price level was below the 80% limit 
 
(b) the average EU market price for a particular grade fell below 78% of the 
Intervention Price. In this case, intervention buying of this grade would take place 
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in those member states or regions where the price level was less than 80% of the 
Intervention Price.  
 
In either case, all offers at or below 80% of the Intervention Price were to be 
accepted. Furthermore, the quantities bought would not be counted as part of the 
220,000 tonne ceiling.  
 
Buying-in prices were fixed by the Beef Management Committee meeting on the 
second and fourth Friday of each month (two days after the deadline for tender 
submission). A maximum buying-in price was fixed for young bulls and steers of 
grade R3 at these meetings and only tenders below this maximum were accepted. 
Buying-in prices were related to market prices as in the temporary arrangements 
introduced in 1987. 
 
The 1987 arrangements were subsequently amended in 1993 and these are still in 
existence.  
 
Intervention 1993 – 
 
Two intervention buying-in procedures exist and these are generally termed: 
 
i) Normal intervention buying; and 
ii) Safety-net buying 
 
Normal intervention buying operates if, for a period of two consecutive weeks, the 
EU average deadweight market price for a quality or group of qualities of beef is 
below 84% of the intervention price. At the same time, the price for the same quality 
or group of qualities in a particular member state must be below 80% of the EU 
intervention price. 
 
Safety-net procedures are triggered if, for a period of two consecutive weeks, the EU 
average deadweight market price falls below 78% of the intervention price and, at the 
same time, prices in a particular member state fall below 60% of the intervention 
price. 
 
The system operates on a tendering basis as before. If tenders are submitted under 
normal intervention procedures they are only considered if they are submitted below a 
maximum cut-off price which equates to  
 
a) the R3 equivalent of the average market price in a member state in the week 
before the week in which the tender closing date falls plus 
b) a fixed ‘processors margin’ of 10 ECU. 
 
Provided tenders are below the cut-off price they will then, under normal intervention 
procedures enter the second round of the adjudication. At this stage a maximum 
buying-in price is set by the beef management committee.  
 
Tenders submitted under safety-net procedures will be accepted if they are submitted 
below a maximum cut-off price equal to the average market price in a member state 
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plus a margin of 6 ECU per 100 kg. All offers below this price will automatically be 
accepted and no further stages of the adjudication procedure are entered into. The 
Commission may apply quantity reduction coefficients to all tonnages accepted under 
normal intervention procedures but not under safety net procedures. Since 1993, it 
may also apply price reduction coefficients to ensure that tender prices in any state are 
not above the cut-off price and to reduce the tender price if market prices fall during 
the delivery period following a tender. Maximum carcass weight and total volume 
limitations (for normal intervention) also apply for purchases into intervention 
storage. 
 
 
The breaking of the link between Institutional Intervention Prices and Intervention 
Buying-in Prices first introduced on a temporary basis in1987 but permanently in 
1989 represented a major dilution of the effectiveness of the intervention system in its 
role of supporting producer prices. The effects can be appreciated from the data 
presented in Table 2 which show the degree of realisation of the Institutional 
Intervention Price for a given category and quality across selected EU member states 
in which steer production is relatively important for years prior to the introduction of 
the new system and for the years subsequent to its introduction.  
 
Table 2. Degree of achievement of R3 steer beef Institutional Intervention Price 
(%) 
Year UK Ireland France UK and 
France Av. * 
1985 94 87 99 97 
1986 82 86 95 89 
Average  88 87 97 93 
New (temporary) system introduced April 1987 which broke link between 
Institutional Intervention Price and buying-in price 
1987 80 86 93 87 
1988 94 93 95 95 
Average 87 90 94 91 
Extended version of the 1987 arrangements introduced April 1989 with reduced 
triggering coefficients 
1989 93 88 102 98 
1990 82 85 99 91 
1991 85 84 91 88 
1992 82 84 92 87 
1993 88 83 96 92 
1994 88 88 101 95 
1995 88 89 100 94 
1996 75 74 86 81 
1997 76 70 84 80 
1998 72 69 89 81 
Average 89/98 83 81 94 89 
 
*Simple arithmetic average of UK and French prices 
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The yearly data in Table 2 are presented graphically in Figure 1. The trend for all 
countries is downward and all follow a generally similar pattern. The Irish and British 
levels are very closely linked but in the period 1989-1998 the Irish average price 
achievement was lowest of the three countries and uniquely and for the first time went 
below 70% in 1998. The relative Irish performance was good in 1988 and also to an 
extent in 1991, 1992, and again in 1994 and 1995. While this paper is concerned 
primarily with assessing the effectiveness of price support given by the intervention 
system it is interesting to speculate in passing as to the possible reasons for 
improvements in the relative Irish price performance. The 1988 performance may be 
related to the supply/demand situation in the EU market at that time which was in 
approximate self-sufficiency balance and also to the relatively high levels of Irish 
beef sold into APS in the Autumn of 1988. The outcome in the first half of the 1990s 
may be related to the increasing penetration of the EU market by Irish beef and to a 
strong live export trade.  
Figure 1. Degree of achievement of R3 steer beef 
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The post BSE performance for Ireland was by far the worst of the three with a 
continual decline in the achievement of intervention price. This may well be a 
reflection of the effects of the ‘lock-out’ from both the UK and French markets which 
Irish beef suffered in the post BSE period with Irish beef exports to both these 
markets falling in 1996 and 1997 compared with 1995 (although showing some 
increase again in 1998 ). It is also a reflection of a poor live export trade. The post 
BSE Irish export performance may in turn be attributed, at least in part, to labelling 
introduced unilaterally in France.  
 
In the period 1989-98 Irish steer R3 beef achieved only 81% of the Intervention Price. 
While the Guide Price was abolished in 1995 it had been the case for many years that 
the Institutional Intervention Price was 90% of the Guide Price. On the basis of a 90% 
relationship between the Intervention and Guide Price, Irish producers in the period 
1989-98 received only 73% (i.e. .90 x 81) of the Guide Price i.e. the price which 
originally it was felt that producers should receive. 
 
In the same period UK and French producers, on average, received 89% of the 
intervention price, that is, 8 percentage points more than Irish producers received for 
the same quality. This amounts to a difference of over Ir£220/tonne or  
10p/lb dw equivalent to £75 per steer of 340kg carcass weight.   
 
 
 
 
Labelling and promotions by Ireland’s EU competitors in their 
domestic markets 
 
 
Council Regulation No. 820/97 of 21 April 1997  
 
This regulation  refers to the de-stabilisation of the EU beef market consequent on the 
BSE crisis of 1996 and asserts that the market can best be re-established by improving 
the transparency of the conditions for the production and marketing of the products 
concerned particularly with regard to traceability. To achieve this it states that it is 
essential to establish a more efficient system for the identification and registration of 
bovine animals at the production stage and a specific Community labelling system 
based on objective criteria at the marketing stage thus protecting human and animal 
health. The proposed labelling system is optional up to 1 January 2000 and is 
compulsory thereafter.  
 
 
With regard to labelling at point of sale the information shown must not go outside 
the bounds of the following: 
 
(a) member state, third country or holding of birth 
(b) member states, third countries or holdings where all or any part of fattening took 
place, with partial fattening having to be specified 
(c) member state, third country or slaughterhouse where slaughter took place 
(d) identification number and sex of the animal 
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(e) method of fattening or other information relating to feeding 
(f) information on slaughtering, such as the age at slaughter and the date of slaughter 
or the period during which the beef was matured 
(g) any other information which the operator or the organisation wishes. 
 
While specification of the member state of origin (however origin is defined) is not 
compulsory it is certainly permissible. Identification of member state of origin is not 
necessary to provide consumer protection and assurance. This can be achieved by 
putting in place the real systems relating to production, transport, slaughter, 
documentation and traceability which do provide real safeguards. The fact that these 
safeguards are in place can be communicated to consumers on labels at point of sale. 
Operational traceability, which surely is not a matter of everyday concern to 
consumers can be achieved by means of coding which does not identify for the 
consumer the member state of origin.  
 
Whether identification of country of origin at consumer level is good or bad from 
Ireland’s point of view depends on the degree to which Irish beef has an 
image/identity in the markets in which it is sold and on whether this is positive or 
negative.  
 
Creation and enhancement of a positive image for Irish beef is an issue for the 
industry and for Bord Bia. 
 
Apart altogether from the Irish perspective it does seem that labelling of beef by 
member state of origin is running counter to the idea of a unified market and is quite 
contrary to the spirit of the European Union. It allows and indeed facilitates the 
development and expression of xenophobia at consumer level. This has very negative 
consequences for countries which have small home markets and which have large 
sales in export markets and as already argued is not necessary in relation to real 
protection and assurance for the consumer.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Demand for beef declined sharply in 1996. Prices and volume of sales declined. There 
has been a recovery post 1996 but Ireland has not benefited in that recovery as have 
other countries most notably France and to a lesser extent the UK – two major 
markets for Ireland and also producers of steer beef. This blow to the Irish beef 
industry struck at a time when the price lifting effect of the intervention system had 
been very substantially eroded by successive alterations so that it now simply follows 
market prices. While the Irish price performance has always been lower than the 
average of that for the UK and France, that for 1996,1997 and 1998 has been at 
historically low levels. The Agenda 2000 CAP reform simply holds existing 
intervention arrangements in place until July 2002 by which time it is envisaged that 
prices will have been reduced by 20% and a new “safety net” system will come into 
operation when prices are less than Ir£1.23/kg or Ir56p/lb. There is no prospect 
therefore of improved support from intervention in the future. 
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Unless one can argue convincingly that Irish beef processors and marketers are in 
some way inferior at their job compared to UK and French operators, then the main 
reasons for both the longer term poor price performance and the historically poor 
performance of 1996, 1997 and 1998 must lie elsewhere. It is suggested here that 
structural reasons such as location, smallness of home market, the relatively huge 
degree of Irish self sufficiency and EU self-sufficiency levels are, inter alia, 
contributors to the longer term problem. It is also suggested that consumer and 
industry responses in our export markets post 1996 BSE in the UK and France 
together with EU political action in the area of labelling have contributed to the more 
recent performance deterioration. The EU action may have the effect of 
maintaining that relative deterioration. The impact of labelling on Irish beef 
exports is a topic worthy of study in its own right. 
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